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BAR BRIEFS

THE RECOVERY PROGRAM
We use, as editorial expression this month, the language of Dean
Clark of the Yale Law School. It is the closing paragraph to a very
fine statement by Dean Clark in the May issue of the American Bar
Association Journal. In that same issue will be found three other
articles dealing with the legal aspects underlying the national recovery
legislation, expressing various points of view. The other articles are
by Hal H. Smith, general counsel of the Michigan Manufacturers
Association, David L. Podell, co-author of the National Recovery Act,
and Frederick H. Wood, member of the New York Bar.
Dean Clark, after leaving the impression that he may not be in
sympathy with such legislation, from the standpoint of its desirability,
takes the ground that questions of constitutional validity should not be
beclouded by one's personal inclinations. We agree, not only on that
point, but with the whole attitude of the Dean's article. It expresses,
in more forceful, logical and finely reasoned order, what we have
endeavored to express on several occasions when writing of the recovery
legislation for these columns.
NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Burrows vs. Paulson: (Mortgages, Deficiency, Remedy). In
1933 plaintiff agreed to sell and convey a quarter of land to defendant
for $4,000. $500 was paid in cash, the remainder being evidenced by
promissory notes, secured by mortgage on the conveyed premises. A
clause in the mortgage made the mortgagor personally liable to the
mortgagee and his assigns for the debt, a clause specifying same to be
enforceable "by all remedies of law applicable to the collection of debt
without respect to the sufficiency of the mortgage security to pay and
discharge" the debt. The parties being in doubt as to the meaning and
effect of N. D. mortgage laws, then on the books or to be enacted,
added this further provision: that, in case the mortgagor could not be
held personally liable, or held for the deficiency, the contract might be
cancelled. With the passage of Chapter 155, 1933 Laws, which states,
"and the court shall have no power to render a deficiency judgment ...
Nothing herein shall be construed to postpone or affect any remedy
the creditor may have against any party personally liable for the
mortgage debt other than the mortgagors and their grantees," plaintiff
construed this to exempt the mortgagor from personal liability, gave
notice of cancellation, tendered back the purchase money, and refused
to accept the note and mortgage. HELD: This (Chapter 155) is a
procedural statute; its whole effect is to relegate a mortgagee foreclosing to an action at law to recover any deficiency after sale; a mortgage is merely a lien; Chapter 155 refers only to the foreclosure
proceedings; it does not affect the mortgagor's personal liability, nor
the remedies of the mortgagee for any deficiency.
Baird, as Receiver, vs. Herr: (Notes, Extension, Waiver, Statute
of Limitations). Defendant and one C. G. H. made a promissory note
to the Bank in 1923, in sum of $1,500. The note stated, "The several
makers, signers, guarantors, and endorsers hereof hereby waive presentment, demand, notice of dishonor and protest, and consent that the
time of payment may be extended or this note renewed without affecting
their liability thereon." Defendant made no payments, but C. G. H. did,
such payments continuing until some time in 1927. Thereafter C. G. H.
died, and his administrators gave a new note for the balance due,
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amounting to $400. The original note was retained by the Bank, marked
"collateral." The new note was given in 1929. Defendant invoked the
statute of limitations. HELD: Payment by one of two or more joint
makers does not of itself suspend the running of the statute of limitations. This was an agreement between the payee and the makers, and
between the makers, that the note could be renewed without notice to
the other maker. There was no agreement that extraneous parties
(administrators) could extend the time of payment or renew. An
accommodation maker is a co-maker, liable as principal, and mere extensions of time of payment do not release him. The extension of time,
however, does not carry the note past the period of the statute of
limitations. Defendant not having signed any extension agreement, or
renewed the note, directly or through his co-maker, the defense of the
statute of limitations is good.
"STOP, LOOK AND LISTEN?' MODIFIED
Pokora vs. Wabash Ry. Co., 54 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580 (U. S.), apparently, is a modification of the "stop, look and listen" doctrine as
related to accidents at railroad crossings. Proceeding over a street
grade crossing, where defendant had four tracks, plaintiff looked and
listened for approaching trains, but did not get out of his truck cab.
His view being obstructed by a string of box cars, he did not see an
approaching train. Justice Cardozo, writing the opinion, said: "It was
his (plaintiff's) duty to look along the track from his seat, if looking
would avail to warn him of the danger. This does not mean, however,
that if vision was cut off by obstacles, there was negligence in going
on, any more than there would have been in trusting to his ears if
vision had been cut off by the darkness of the night. . . A jury, but
not the court, might say that with faculties thus limited he should have
found some other means of assuring himself of safety before venturing
to cross. . . In default of the guide of customary conduct, what is
suitable may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations
that are fitting for the common-place or normal. In default of the guide
of customary conduct, what is suitable for the traveler caught in a
mesh where the ordinary safeguards fail him is for the judgment of a
jury. . . The opinion in Goodman's case (B. & 0. vs. Goodman, 275
U. S. 66), has been a source of confusion in the federal courts to the
extent that it imposes a standard for application by the judge, and has
had only wavering support in the courts of the state. We limit it
accordingly."
BELIEVE IT OR NOT
In this, our fourth year of Depression, America's inventory
discloses 76,000,000 life insurance policies and savings accounts, totaling
$92,000,000,000, one-third of the railway mileage of the world, 73% of
the automobiles, 58% of the telephones, 32% of the coal produced,
62% of the petroleum pumped, 35% of the copper mined, 34% of the
pig iron and 37% of the steel produced, 52% of the world's corn and
62% of its cotton, more public schools per population, more institutions
of higher learning, more libraries, more hospitals, more free clinics,
more asylums, more institutions for the defective, more newspapers,
more periodicals, more books, more and better music, more theatres,
more movies, more radios, more electric appliances, more homes, more
things to make life livable than any other corner of the globe, and yet
more heated minds to make us lose faith in ourselves and our institu-

